MA’MURIY ISLOHOTLARNING SHARQ MODELLARI QIYOSIY TAHLILI
Keywords:
Liberal-demokratik partiya, Janubiy Osiyo, byurokratiya, Gomindan, Millatchilar partiyasi, kommunistik partiyalar, siyosiy agentlar, ma'muriy modellar.Abstract
Ma’muriy islohotlarni, o‘zgarishlarni tahlil qilish va tushuntirishda, shuningdek, tizimlarning barqaror holatini saqlashda alohida milliy davlatlarda ham, xalqaro qiyosiy tadqiqotlarda ham neo-institutsional nazariya doirasidagi yondashuv tobora kengayib bormoqda va tobora ko'proq e'tiborni tortmoqda. Ushbu yondashuvdan foydalanishga misollar juda ko'p: ma'muriy o'zgarishlarni o'rganishda, ma'muriy islohotlarni tahlil qilishda, birinchi navbatda, yangi davlat boshqaruvidan foydalangan holda, turli mamlakatlardagi mahalliy o'zini o'zi boshqarish muammolarini qiyosiy va alohida-alohida ko'rib chiqadigan ishlarda, davlat xizmatlari tizimlarini o'rganishda Sharqiy Osiyo demokratik mamlakatlaridagi ma’muriy islohot Markaziy Osiyo islohotlardan farqli tarixiy kontekstdan kelib chiqadi. Bu hodisadan sharqiy boshqaruv modelining ikkinchi xususiyati va birinchi navbatda umrbod nim tizimi kelib chiqadi. Boshqaruvning ushbu uslubiga rioya qiladigan tashkilot, xususan, yaponiyaliklar, ish haqi va mas'uliyat to'g'ridan-to'g'ri ish hajmiga bog'liq. Yangi joyga ko'chib o'tishda mehnat maqomi bekor qilinadi va xodim o'z maqsadiga erishish uchun yana harakat qilishi kerak. Shuning uchun Sharqiy tashkiliy lavozimdagi xodimlar uchun masala ularning egallab turgan lavozimida emas, balki qaysi kompaniyaga tegishli ekanligidadir. Kognitiv ishga yollash tizimi sarflangan sadoqat uzoq vaqt davomida sezilishiga ishonch tufayli yuqori sifatli ishni bajarish uchun rag'bat bo'lib xizmat qiladi. Bundan tashqari, bunday tizim barqarorlik garovi bo'lib, Sharq jamiyatida allaqachon kuchaygan jamoa tuyg'usining kuchayishiga olib keladi va kompaniya ichidagi munosabatlarni yaxshilaydi. Bu guruh manfaatlarini shaxsiy manfaatlardan ustun qo'yishda, o'z manfaatlarini kompaniyalar manfaatlari bilan namoyon qilishda va faoliyatning barcha sohalarida uyg'unlikka erishish istagida sodir bo'ladi. Shaxs alohida bir butun sifatida idrok etilishini to'xtatadi va umumiy massa bilan qo'shilib, o'zining individualligini faqat ma'lum bir guruh doirasida namoyon qiladi.
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